RTAF – Air Attaché Office in Hanoi
DEFENSE NEWS BULLETIN 30.April.2022
1. US – VIETNAM PARTNERSHIP GOES BEYOND STRATEGIC COMPETITION WITH CHINA.
Hanoi’s ‘multi-directional’ foreign policy provides opportunities for a stronger ASEAN and more trusted U.S.-Vietnam relationship.
When the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was founded in 1967, one of its initial goals was to contain the threat of communism during the Vietnam War. It is a remarkable turn of history that 55 years later, Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Minh Chính is coming this year to Washington for the ASEAN leaders summit with President Biden. Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN in 1995 — the same year when Hanoi and Washington normalized relations — was the first big step of Hanoi’s “multi-directional” foreign policy. As the Biden administration identifies Vietnam as one of the key countries in its Indo-Pacific Strategy, it needs to recognize Hanoi’s preference for multilateralism in its engagement policy.
President Biden attends a virtual U.S.-ASEAN Summit meeting, Tuesday, Oct. 26, 2021. (Stefani Reynolds/The New York Times)
Vietnam’s multi-directional policy originally aimed to enlarge its network of friends to safeguard against uncertainty after the Cold War, when it had depended excessively on the Soviet Union. ASEAN membership marked the beginning of Vietnam’s regional and global integration, contributing to its economic successes over the past three decades. Hanoi’s strategic direction to become a regional middle power is heavily centered on this multilateral approach.
Although bilateral U.S.-Vietnam exchanges have increased significantly in the past few years, direct contact is not the only way to deepen the partnership. Indirect channels via regional arrangements such as ASEAN and U.S. allies and partners in the region offer alternative spaces for dialogue and cooperation.
The Web of Cooperation
Despite recent criticism of ASEAN’s irrelevance with the return of great power competition, regional platforms remain tremendously important. Within ASEAN, Vietnam can make its voice heard, connect with like-minded partners and gain international support in countering China’s increasing aggression in the East (“South China”) Sea. ASEAN’s various expanded forums, such as the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum, provide ideal platforms to discuss issues which might be deemed too sensitive bilaterally.
For Hanoi, multilateralism always comes with trade. The country has a trade-to-GDP ratio of nearly 200 percent, one of the highest in the world. Vietnam is a party to 15 free trade agreements (FTAs), including the high-standard 2019 EU-Vietnam FTA and the 2018 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership.
These arrangements, both economic and political, provide platforms for Washington to work with Vietnam on matters of shared interest, as well as the opportunity to enhance and shape a rules-based regional order. Unfortunately, cooperating with regional multilateral institutions has not been a priority for U.S. foreign policy since the Obama administration. The United States also seems to lack effective regional trade and economic cooperation policies after its withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Although President Biden has emphasized re-engagement with Asia, this has mostly occurred through smaller networks of partners, such as the Quad.
U.S. regional allies, with which Hanoi has close relations, offer a second path to enhancing U.S. cooperation with Vietnam. Japan and South Korea are Vietnam’s largest and second-largest sources of investment, respectively. In the past decade, both countries have expanded security cooperation with Hanoi, perhaps with an eye toward China’s regional ambitions. Tokyo gifted Hanoi six used patrol vessels in 2013 and provided loans worth $338 million to build another six in 2017. In November 2021, during Chính’s visit to Japan, both sides agreed to “accelerate consultations for the transfer of specific equipment including naval vessels and related equipment.”
Less publicly, South Korea has also reinforced defense ties with Vietnam over the past few years, as have India and Australia. These strong relations provide an effective backchannel for Hanoi to indirectly cooperate with Washington on areas such as intelligence sharing and maritime security.
The rationale is not just to strengthen the Vietnam-U.S. bilateral relationship, but to engage with a network of like-minded countries that share mutual interests. To paraphrase a recent RAND report, the United States needs to thicken the web of cooperation with Vietnam in the Indo-Pacific to include regional foreign affairs and defense dialogues, joint military training and exercises, arms sales and transfers, and/or new bilateral or multilateral agreements. In the long term, this will be more sustainable and effective than the quid-pro-quo approach of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
Vietnam’s China Dilemma
Despite Vietnam’s rapprochement with the United States, China remains the “top priority” of Vietnamese foreign policy, in words attributed to Foreign Minister Bùi Thanh Sơn. Beijing has many points of leverage at its disposal to induce or coerce Hanoi. China’s decision to close border gates in late 2021 caused great damage to Vietnamese exporters. Despite tensions on sovereignty issues, the Vietnamese and Chinese Communist parties maintain an intimate relationship due to their ideological alignment. Beijing wisely exploits the Vietnamese party’s fear of regime change to shape a wedge strategy toward the Vietnam-U.S. partnership, warning leaders in Hanoi of potential “color revolutions.”
Being a neighbor of a powerful nation, Vietnam is rightly concerned about the repercussions of being seen as “ganging up” on China. As the country has faced multiple invasions from China, the most recent in 1979, there is always a security concern emanating from the northern border. This might explain why Vietnam and the United States have not upgraded their relationship to the “strategic partnership” level, although the matter has been raised since 2018. Hanoi does not want to be caught in the crossfire of great power competition.
Shared Interests as the Basis for Friendship
There is no doubt that U.S.-Vietnam relations are at the best stage since the end of the Vietnam War. Despite the war’s legacy, Vietnamese hold one of the most favorable views on the United States in Asia. Vietnam is the only Southeast Asian country in the top 10 of U.S. trading partners, and American manufacturers increasingly consider Vietnam as an alternative destination to China. Strategic interests have converged significantly in the last decade, leading to expanded security cooperation signaled by the lift of the U.S. embargo on lethal arms sales in 2016. Hanoi is an ardent supporter of a rules-based regional order as well as the U.S.-led free and open Indo-Pacific Strategy. Although the scenario of a formal alliance is unlikely, the upward trajectory is clear. When visiting Vietnam in August 2021, Vice President Kamala Harris indicated that both sides were working toward a strategic partnership.
U.S. rapprochement with Vietnam is more than a way to “contain” China (as if this could be done). A long-term, stable friendship should not be based solely on mutual concern about a rising regional hegemon. Washington should not only focus on economic and security partnerships but needs to support Vietnam in areas that it is lagging behind, particularly institutional reforms and the increased repression of civil society. A more democratic and open Vietnam will not only be good for the Vietnamese but a more trusted regional partner. A friendship based on shared values is much more sustainable than the one based purely on security and economic interests.
Certainly, this is not easy, because the United States often promotes democracy in principle while compromising it in practice. But helping Vietnam improve its record on human rights and democracy need not sound like a “color revolution,” as the recent experience of labor reforms in the EU-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement indicates. A multilateral U.S. approach, including trade and strategic cooperation, can avoid key regional pitfalls and bring about substantive progress in the bilateral relationship.
(By United States Institute of Peace)
2. VIETNAM, CHINA HOLD BORDER DEFENCE FRIENDSHIP EXCHANGE 2022.
General Phan Van Giang, Minister of National Defence of Vietnam, and Senior Lieutenant General Wei Fenghe, Minister of National Defence of China, co-hosted the seventh border defence friendship exchange on April 23.
Defence Minister Phan Van Giang of Vientam and his Chinese counterpart Wei Fenghe pose for a photo at Shuikou International Border Gate before holding talks.
The exchange took place in Quang Hoa district of Cao Bang province (Vietnam) and Longzhou district of Guangxi province (China).
During their talks in Longzhou district, Gen. Giang affirmed that the Party, State, Government and People’s Army of Vietnam always attach great importance to consolidating the traditional friendship and promoting the Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership with China, considering this as one of the top priority in the country’s foreign policy.
Minister Giang thanked the Chinese Ministry of National Defense for its support and donation of COVID-19 vaccines to the Vietnamese Ministry of National Defense.
Welcoming the Vietnamese delegation, Sen. Lieut. Gen. Wei noted both sides have always cultivated and built a good relationship since they held the sixth border defense friendship exchange a year ago. He said he believes these activities will definitely further strengthen the China-Vietnam friendship and solidarity, increase political trust, foster practical cooperation in order to build a peaceful and stable border, and bring happiness to the two peoples.
Vietnamese and Chinese defence officials pose for a group photo before their talks.
The two sides shared the view that despite the negative impact caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, defense cooperation between Vietnam and China over the past time has been maintained through flexible and effective forms of exchange. Notably, they successfully organized a joint military medical exercise in December 2021 in Mong Cai city, Quang Ninh province (Vietnam).
The two sides agreed to promote the exchange of delegations at all levels and effectively implement existing cooperation mechanisms, including the Defense Strategy Dialogue at the deputy ministerial level and the annual border defense friendship exchange, as well as cooperation between armed forces and academies.
They will continue to coordinate closely in strictly implementing land border agreements, strictly protecting the border, combating crime, illegal entry and exit, and preventing epidemics from spreading across the border.
They also consented to continue to coordinate and support each other at multilateral military and defense forums.
The two sides frankly discussed and agreed to solve outstanding issues, in the common interests of the two countries, by peaceful means and on the basis of international law.
In the afternoon, Minister Wei led a Chinese delegation to hold a similar exchange in Quang Hoa district of Cao Bang province.
(By The Voice of Vietnam)
3. VIETNAM SAYS IT DISCUSSED ARMY GAMES WITH RUSSIA, NOT MILITARY DRILLS.
Russia’s state media reported on April 19 that Russia and Vietnam would hold a joint military training exercise.
(A T-72 B3 tank operated by a crew from Vietnam drives during the Tank Biathlon competition at the International Army Games 2020 at Alabino range in Moscow Region, Russia, Aug. 24, 2020)
The Vietnamese Defense Ministry says that a meeting this month with Russia did not discuss a joint military exercise as reported Russian state media but an international military competition.
Vietnam’s version of events published in the official military newspaper Sunday could be intended to distance Vietnam from bilateral military activities with Russia amid international condemnation of the war in Ukraine.
Quan Doi Nhan Dan, the official mouthpiece of Vietnam’s armed forces, reported that on April 15 a Vietnamese delegation led by Maj. Gen. Do Dinh Thanh, commander of Vietnam Army’s Tank Force and Armored Warfare, took part in a virtual meeting with the Russian side to discuss Vietnam’s participation in the Army Games 2022.
The International Army Games, dubbed the War Olympics, is an annual military competition hosted by Russia since 2015, usually at the end of summer. Participating armies compete in different events such as “tank biathlon,” infantry, anti-aircraft artillery and troop intelligence.
China has been a regular participant of the games while Vietnam began taking part in 2018 together with nearly 30 other countries. Analysts say the Army Games aims to showcase the military prowess of Russia and other countries, as well as promote Russian weapons and technologies to prospective buyers.
The report in Quan Doi Nhan Dan said the Vietnamese general had requested that his tank team be allowed to arrive early for training and familiarization “if the Army Games are to take place” this year.
Bilateral military activities
Russia is waging a full-scale war in Ukraine after invading its neighbor on Feb. 24. The invasion, widely condemned by the international community, has caused the largest refugee crisis in Europe since World War II.
On April 19, Russia’s state media reported that Russia and Vietnam were planning to hold a joint military training exercise.
The move was described by analysts as “inappropriate” and likely to “raise eyebrows” in the rest of the region.
Russian state-run news agency RIA Novosti said the initial planning meeting for the military training exercise was held virtually between the leaders of Russia’s Eastern Military District and the Vietnamese army.
The news came as the U.S. announced a May 12-13 summit in Washington with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, including Vietnam.
Vietnam considers Russia a traditional ally and a “comprehensive strategic partner,” and has been supportive of Moscow despite international outrage over Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.
Earlier this month, Vietnam voted against a U.S.-led resolution to remove Russia from the U.N. Human Rights Council. Before that, Hanoi abstained from voting to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine at the U.N. General Assembly.
Vietnamese army officials are usually very tight-lipped about international affairs, and the report in the official army newspaper could be viewed as a denial of involvement in bilateral military activities with Russia.
(By Radio Free Asia)
4. AUSTRALIA AND VIETNAM: STRENGTHENING PEACEKEEPING COOPERATION.
Australia is committed to deepening bilateral ties with its regional and strategic partners, including the shared and growing peacekeeping relationship with Vietnam.
In recent years, Australia has supported Vietnam’s peacekeeping mission to the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) through specialist peacekeeping training, equipment, and strategic airlift support.
(Australia and Vietnam Strengthen Peacekeeping Ties)
Australia is pleased to be strengthening peacekeeping cooperation with Vietnam by providing strategic airlift support to its peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.
A Royal Australian Air Force C-17A Globemaster III aircraft will transport Vietnam People’s Army personnel, equipment, and medical supplies to and from Juba, South Sudan, in April and May 2022.
Today, President Nguyễn Xuân Phúc attended a farewell ceremony held in honour of the aircraft’s departure from Hanoi, which marks the fourth time Australia has provided strategic airlift to Vietnam’s UNMISS operation since 2018.
Australia and Vietnam’s cooperation on international peacekeeping further marks our shared commitment to ensuring global peace, security, and stability. Our deepening peacekeeping cooperation is a testament to the strength of our strategic partnership.
(By Defense News of Australia Government)
(THE-END)